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Abstract This paper provides a legal and empirical analysis of certain aspects of the
European Union’s early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity. It discusses
the admissibility criteria for opinions from national parliaments against EU legislative
proposals; it considers which principles national parliaments actually apply in these
opinions in practice; and it develops practical legal techniques on how to incorporate
principles other than subsidiarity in such opinions.
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1 Introduction
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the early warning system
for the principle of proportionality is officially operational. National parliaments are
invited to check EU legislative proposals against the principle of subsidiarity and to
send a letter called reasoned opinion to the Brussels institutions if they believe that
the principle is violated.1 Yet effectively the application of this subsidiarity check
had started already well before its official entry into force. In 2006 the European
1The core provisions are Articles 6 and 7 of Protocol no. 2 TEU/TFEU. Articles 5 (3) and 12 (b) TEU
and Article 69 TFEU also refer to that Protocol.
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Commission has declared, in its Barroso initiative, to welcome letters from national
parliaments as part of a broader political dialogue.2 And in fact the national par-
liaments, in their half-yearly inter-parliamentary conference COSAC, had decided
already in late 2004 to select potentially interesting EU proposals and to experiment
collectively with the subsidiarity check as it was enshrined, at the time, in the Consti-
tutional Treaty.3 This means we have not just two but about seven years of practical
experience. What lessons can we draw thus far? What goes well, what are the chal-
lenges? How do different parliaments, and chambers of parliaments, deal with their
role under the subsidiarity check? This article shall review some of the most impor-
tant procedural details of the system, with a focus on the admissibility of reasoned
opinions; it shall then take stock of the most important experiences, focusing on the
substantive scope of opinions in practice, and formulate policy recommendations for
the future. But first, since the subsidiarity check is merely one of the European roles
that national parliaments can and do play, a brief legal background shall be provided
regarding the role of national parliaments pursuant to the EU Treaties in general.
2 National parliaments in the European Treaties
Traditionally, the parliaments of the Member States were not an object of particu-
lar interest for the system of the European Treaties. True, national parliaments were
typically the ones who ratified these Treaties in the first place, who played an impor-
tant role in calling to account national ministers as they negotiated directives in the
Council, and who, in their legislative capacity, transposed directives into national law.
However, none of these roles were created or regulated by the Treaties themselves:
they derived, where applicable, from national constitutional law. Accordingly, these
functions could, and still can, differ across Member States: referendums may replace
parliamentary votes for Treaty ratification, the national government or regional law-
makers may replace the national parliament regarding the transposition of directives,
and the means and intensity by which parliaments call to account their ministers in
EU affairs is a matter of diverse legal and political idiosyncrasies in each system.4
Nevertheless, over the course of the 1990s the Treaties have been increasingly ad-
dressing national parliaments for various purposes: first in Final Act Declarations
(Maastricht Treaty), then in a Protocol (Treaty of Amsterdam) and finally in the text
proper (Constitutional Treaty and Treaty of Lisbon). In fact by now, under the regime
of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaties and Protocols of the EU explicitly mention the
national parliaments on no less than two dozen occasions.
To appreciate the various instances where the TEU, the TFEU and their Proto-
cols address the Member States’ national parliaments for EU purposes, it is neces-
sary to go through the entire text of these instruments, though. In other words, it is
2
‘A citizens’ agenda—Delivering results for Europe’, COM (2006) 211 final.
3COSAC Secretariat, Report on the results of COSAC’s Pilot project on the 3rd Railway Package to test
the “Subsidiarity early warning mechanism”, Luxembourg, 17–18 May 2005.
4Kiiver [7]; see also Tans [10]; Auel, Benz [1] and the still-influential volume Maurer, Wessels [9].
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not enough to check Article 12 TEU. That Article states: ‘National Parliaments con-
tribute actively to the good functioning of the Union:’ and, after that colon, goes on
to list a number of instances where either the TEU, the TFEU or the Protocols refer to
national parliaments. However, several instances are actually not restated in Article
12, without any obvious reason why not. For example, Article 12 affirms relatively
banal rights, such as the right of national parliaments to be notified of incoming EU
membership applications. But at the same time it omits rather significant facilities like
the binding veto right of each national parliament against simplified Treaty amend-
ment in the area of family law. The body of the Treaties and Protocols itself yields
the following, far more helpful list:
2.1 Information rights
• The national parliaments’ right to receive directly the Commission’s consultative
documents, the annual legislative programme as well as any other instrument of
legislative planning or policy (Article 12 (a) TEU and Article 1 Protocol No. 1
TEU/TFEU);
• the right to receive directly EU draft legislative acts: from the Commission if it
concerns Commission proposals, from the European Parliament if it concerns ini-
tiatives of the European Parliament, and from the Council if it concerns proposals
from a group of Member States or requests or recommendations from the Court
of Justice, the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank (Arti-
cle 12 (a) TEU and Article 2 Protocol No. 1 as well as Article 4 Protocol No. 2
TEU/TFEU);
• the right to receive amended drafts and legislative resolutions of the European
Parliament and positions of the Council on draft legislative acts (Article 4 Protocol
No. 2 TEU/TFEU);
• the right to receive directly the agendas for and the outcome of meetings of the
Council (Article 5 Protocol No. 1 TEU/TFEU);
• the right to have special attention drawn to planned applications of the flexibility
clause (Article 352 TFEU) in the context of the regular subsidiarity enforcement
procedure of Protocol No. 2 TEU/TFEU;
• the right to be notified of planned applications of the ordinary Treaty revision pro-
cedure (Article 12 (d) and Article 48 (2) TEU);
• the right to be notified of planned applications of the general passerelle within
the simplified Treaty revision procedure (Article 12 (d), Article 48 (7) TEU and
Article 6 Protocol No. 1 TEU/TFEU);
• the right to be notified of planned applications of the special passerelle in the area
of family law (Article 81 (3) TFEU);
• the right to be notified of the receipt of EU membership applications (Article 12
(e) TEU and Article 49 TEU);
• the right to receive an annual report from the Commission on the application of
Article 5 TEU on the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality (Ar-
ticle 9 Protocol No. 2 TEU/TFEU); and
• the right to receive the annual report of the Court of Auditors (Article 7 Protocol
No. 1 TEU/TFEU).
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2.2 Provisions envisaging or implying an evaluation by national parliaments
• The national parliaments’ right to be informed of the content and results of evalu-
ations of policies in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 12 (c) TEU
and Article 70 TFEU);
• involvement in the evaluations of the activities of Eurojust (Article 12 (c) TEU and
Article 85 (1) TFEU) pursuant to regulations to be adopted on Eurojust’s structure,
operation, field of action and tasks;
• involvement in the political monitoring or scrutiny of Europol (Article 12 (c) TEU
and Article 88 (2) TFEU) pursuant to regulations to be adopted on Europol’s struc-
ture, operation, field of action and tasks; and
• the right to be informed of the proceedings of the Council’s standing committee on
the operational cooperation on internal security (Article 71 TFEU).
2.3 Provisions envisaging or implying active input from national parliaments
• The respect by the EU institutions of an eight-week period between the transmis-
sion of a draft legislative act and its placing on the Council’s provisional agenda,
during which no agreement may be reached; the respect of a ten-day period be-
tween the draft act’s placing on the provisional agenda and the adoption of a po-
sition; and the duty for the Council in each case to justify exceptions in cases of
urgency (Article 4 Protocol No. 1 TEU/TFEU). In the light of the first two recitals
of the Preamble of Protocol No. 1, this minimum delay rule is meant as an oppor-
tunity for domestic parliamentary scrutiny and the expression of opinions on EU
draft legislative acts;
• the enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity (Article 12 (b) TEU as well as
Article 5 (3) TEU, and again Article 69 TFEU specifically for the area of freedom,
security and justice, all referring to Protocol No. 2 TEU/TFEU). The Protocol in
turn includes:
– an early warning system for the submission of reasoned opinions which in turn
trigger certain consequences when certain thresholds are reached (Article 3 Pro-
tocol No. 1 and Article 6 and 7 of Protocol No. 2 TEU/TFEU); and
– the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to hear annulment actions for alleged
breaches of subsidiarity notified by Member States on behalf of national parlia-
ments (Article 8 Protocol No. 2 TEU/TFEU);
• the participation of representatives of national parliaments in Treaty amendment
Conventions within ordinary Treaty revision (Article 12 (d) and Article 48 (3)
TEU);
• the right for each parliament to veto the application of the general passerelle within
simplified Treaty revision (Article 12 (d) and Article 48 (7) TEU);
• the right for each parliament to veto the application of the special passerelle in the
area of family law (Article 81 (3) TFEU); and
• inter-parliamentary cooperation in accordance with Protocol No. 1 TEU/TFEU
(Article 12 (f) TEU). Protocol No. 1 TEU/TFEU in turn includes:
– the right for COSAC, an inter-parliamentary conference, to issue contributions,
without however binding national parliaments or prejudging their positions (Ar-
ticle 10 Protocol No. 1 TEU/TFEU); and
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– the task for COSAC to promote the exchange of information and best practice
between national parliaments and the European Parliament (Article 10 Protocol
No. 1 TEU/TFEU).
2.4 Provision of dubious legal value
• ‘Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or
Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically
accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens’ (Article 10 (2)
TEU, second clause). It is hard to see anything but a declaratory statement in that
provision, which means it might as well have been put into a preamble. It could
not be prescriptive since, for example, governments in parliamentary systems tend
to be accountable only to lower chambers of parliament, not to senates, a nuance
that Article 10 TEU does not capture; in any event, parliamentary accountability
in the Member States predates Article 10 and can well continue to exist without it.
3 The subsidiarity check: the procedural framework
Behind a relatively straightforward idea of the subsidiarity check system, the inno-
vation which tends to draw most attention as regards the role of national parliaments
under the Treaty of Lisbon, looms a system of great complexity. The system is not
just a loose exchange of opinions between national parliaments and Brussels, but a
legally formalized communication framework with rights and obligations, admissi-
bility criteria and deadlines.5 Article 6 of Protocol no. 2 to the TEU and the TFEU on
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in fact contains
five admissibility criteria for reasoned opinions. Thus, a reasoned opinion must:
• originate in a national parliament or chamber thereof;
• concern a draft legislative act of the EU;
• be sent in time;
• contain reasons; and
• allege a violation of the principle of subsidiarity.
To start with the first criterion, the Treaties contain neither a definition nor a list of
the institutions that are actually meant by ‘national parliaments’. In most cases the
question is not problematic, but there are grey areas. Can a regional parliament under
certain circumstances be considered to be a (chamber of a) national parliament and,
as a result, enjoy rights attributed to national parliaments proper?6 Or is a parliament
or chamber allowed to issue reasoned opinions by a minority vote? What is undis-
puted is that a parliament or chamber can allow a committee to speak on its behalf,
even without plenary endorsement, as long as the committee’s opinion can be consid-
ered to represent the opinion of the parliament or chamber as a whole. I furthermore
5For an elaborate discussion on the procedure, its theory and practice, see Kiiver [5]. See also Cooper [3];
Louis [8], 429–452; Barrett [2]; and Wyrzykowski, Puchta & Ziolkowski [11].
6This question acutely concerns Belgium, where regional and community assemblies are considered to
form part of a composite national parliament together with the national parliament proper.
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submit that minority-based opinions must be accepted by the Union if a parliament
or chamber were to decide to introduce such an instrument, as long as that opinion
is, again, the uniform standpoint of the chamber as a whole. Similar constructions
already exist in Member States such as Germany and France, where a parliamentary
minority can trigger the launch of an annulment action against existing EU legisla-
tion before the Court of Justice.7 As far as the subsidiarity check is concerned, the
Union is in no position to regulate parliaments’ internal procedures, it cannot regu-
late whether they adopt their decisions by relative, absolute or qualified majority, of
component members, of members present or of votes cast. And where a parliament
or chamber as a whole is compelled to act, in accordance with the constitution, with
legislation or the parliamentary rules of procedure, upon the motion of, for example,
one-third of its members, the resulting reasoned opinion should be deemed admissi-
ble.
Reasoned opinions must refer to a draft legislative act, i.e. an act within the mean-
ing of Article 3 of the Protocol. This is broader than it seems, but in a certain sense it
is also narrower than it seems. It is broader because not only Commission proposals
are covered but also initiatives of a group of Member States and the European Parlia-
ment as well as requests from the Court of Justice and the European Investment Bank
and recommendations from the European Central Bank for the adoption of a legisla-
tive act. And it is narrower because a number of acts do not fall within the scope of
the Protocol: the Commission’s consultation documents within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 1 of Protocol no. 1 TEU/TFEU on the role of national parliaments in the EU,
i.e. green and white papers and communications, but also ‘amended drafts’ within
the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol no. 2. Even if the Commission, prompted by
the subsidiarity check, amends its proposal—which so far has never happened—then
that amended draft is not the object of another subsidiarity check. The same holds
true for amendments adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. In other
words, the subsidiarity check takes place neither at the beginning nor at the end of a
legislative process, but in the middle of it. A national parliament that wishes to get in-
volved earlier, and to follow up on what happens to its reasoned opinion and the draft,
which may undergo heavy amendments, therefore must seek alternative information
channels.
Incidentally, the Commission is committed, in the framework of the political di-
alogue, to reply to all letters from national parliaments even if they fall outside the
scope of the subsidiarity check.8 This concerns letters in cases where the official yel-
low and orange card thresholds have not been reached, i.e. where, after the counting
7See Article 88-6 of the French and Article 23 (1a) of the German Constitution. Although many prac-
titioners seem to assume that Article 8 of Protocol no. 2 gives national parliaments the right to initiate
cases, or at least obliges Member States to create facilities for such initiatives, I should stress that at close
reading Article 8, with its cumbersome passive grammatical construction, in fact creates neither rights for
parliaments nor duties for governments, and that it merely repeats what is already known from Article 263
TFEU.
8See the Commission’s message to the national parliaments: Practical arrangements for the opera-
tion of the subsidiarity control mechanism under protocol no 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon, letter of Presi-
dent Barroso and Vice-president Wallström of 1 December 2009, Annex, available at ec.europa.eu/dgs/
secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/letter_en.pdf.
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of letters and their conversion into votes, not enough votes have been raised against a
proposal in order to force its review and re-justification. It also concerns letters which
are not related to subsidiarity, of which more below. But it also concerns letters sent
too early, e.g. letters responding to white papers and not to actual proposals, and let-
ters sent too late, i.e. letters sent after the eight-week deadline or letters discussing
legislation in force. The subsidiarity check is therefore narrower than the political
dialogue in terms of both substantive scope and timeframe.
Speaking of timeframes: when is a national parliament’s reasoned opinion consid-
ered to be ‘in time’? The short answer is that the relevant period is eight weeks, but
for practitioners’ purposes this is in fact too general. The period can be both shorter
and longer than that. It can be longer because the clock only starts ticking when the
last language version of an EU proposal has been transmitted.9 Some versions are
ready sooner than others, and the difference can amount to several weeks. When a
parliament receives ‘its’ version, this therefore does not mean that the clock is al-
ready ticking; if a parliament, its committees, its members or staff are prepared to
read a proposal in another language, notably English or French, even more time is
gained. Furthermore, upon a COSAC initiative, the Commission does not count the
month of August towards the eight-week total. The Commission likes to present this
as a concession to take into account parliaments’ summer recess,10 but of course it
has a summer recess in August itself. It should be noted, though, that this arrangement
only applies to the Commission and not the other initiators of legislative drafts, such
as Member States, and it does not apply to other periods when a national parliament
cannot be active either, such as the Christmas recess or the period after a dissolution
of parliament pending elections or a re-constitution of the plenary. Yet the period may
also be shorter. Article 6 of Protocol no. 2 does not contain any urgency procedures,
but Article 4 of Protocol no. 1 does, in that the eight-week period during which the
Council must wait for national parliamentary scrutiny can be overridden. Effectively,
in such case the subsidiarity check is over. Parliaments who feel unjustly deprived
of their opportunity to formulate a reasoned opinion, or parties otherwise seeking to
challenge adopted EU legislation in court, are free to complain about the urgency
override as well. For the cutting short of the period under Protocol no. 1 reasons
must be given, and if those reasons are missing or insufficient, one may legitimately
claim not only a breach of that Protocol but also a procedural violation of subsidiarity
compliance.
A reasoned opinion must contain reasons, a blank rejection is not permissible but
this does not actually occur in reality. What is more pertinent is what exactly is meant
by subsidiarity. In principle, subsidiarity is neatly defined in Article 5 (3) TEU, but in
practice different parliaments use different definitions of that term and, overall, seem
to require a somewhat broader interpretation.
9Article 6 Protocol no. 2 TEU/TFEU. A small detail: the English version contains a superfluous comma
after the word ‘act’, suggesting the opposite of what it supposedly means, namely that the clock starts tick-
ing for each parliament individually and that parliaments are merely free to write their reasoned opinions
in the Union’s official languages. Evidently this is nonsense, and the punctuation in the French version is
correct. Treaty and corrigendum drafters, please remove the extra comma from the English version!
10See note 7 above.
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Table 1 Typical wordings in reasoned opinions
Nature of the reasoned opinion Formulation
positive Finds that subsidiarity has been complied with
Is unable to detect any breach of subsidiarity
Has no reason to make any comments
negative Has some doubts, concerns or reservations
Requires further information, withholds verdict
Finds that subsidiarity has been breached
4 Form and scope of reasoned opinions
Regarding the content of reasoned opinions, this article shall consider two key ques-
tions. The first is in which manner reasoned opinions are formulated by different
parliaments in practice. The second is which principles are discussed therein, or from
which angle parliaments approach their subject. The Commission makes incoming
reasoned opinions available in a useful but hard to find online archive, and is busy
adding documents received earlier as well.11
4.1 Form
Many national parliaments are apparently reluctant to categorically claim a violation
of the principle of subsidiarity. The following types of formulations occur in practice
(Table 1).
On the one hand, this raises the question whether reasoned opinions may be pos-
itive in the first place? Article 6 of Protocol no. 2 only envisages negative opinions
alleging a breach. Nevertheless some parliaments also send positive verdicts: when
they participate in collective review of a proposal selected by COSAC and find no
breach, but also when they have considered a proposal upon their own initiative. The
legal answer, I submit, is that ‘reasoned opinion’ is a substantive, not a formal con-
cept. It will count as a vote even if it is not called a reasoned opinion, and it will not
count as a vote even if it is called a reasoned opinion but is in fact positive. Calls for
greater terminological clarity are understandable but ultimately a matter of political
choice.
On the other hand, the question remains when exactly a reasoned opinion can be
considered negative? Just how negatively do they have to be formulated? Here, as
with other as yet unclear aspects of the subsidiarity check, the Commission prefers
not to determine its standpoint, and instead observes how practice evolves and waits
with a formal counting and weighing of reasoned opinions until the parliaments will
start getting numerically closer to the yellow card threshold of one-quarter or one-
third of the votes allocated to them. The COSAC secretariat in any event plays it safe:
in the collective reviews COSAC has sponsored, of which there have been eight so far,
11ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm.
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it counts a letter as a vote only where a parliament or chamber literally and unequivo-
cally states that subsidiarity has been breached. Subtler opinions are not counted, but
it does make a difference. It is often claimed that the yellow card threshold has never
been reached yet. With a somewhat broader approach to counting opinions, however,
it appears that there has been one case where the yellow card was raised, at least could
have been deemed to have been raised. This concerns a proposal on the law of suc-
cession which had been subjected to a COSAC review in late 2009.12 The secretariat
counted only one vote, the one of the Belgian Senate. But if it had also counted those
parliaments which had said more or less the same as the Senate but which had for-
mulated their objections in a more cautious way, and those which had said the same
thing but which had framed it as a proportionality argument, as a competence issue or
as a substantive comment, or which had claimed that the Commission’s justification
did not suffice to establish that subsidiarity was respected, then together the national
parliaments would have generated between them around 20 votes. This is enough for
a yellow card.
4.2 Scope
The scope of reasoned opinions can be as important as their form, which brings
us to the second question: which principles are relevant for the subsidiarity check?
Strictly speaking, the check revolves exclusively around subsidiarity: the Protocol
relates to both subsidiarity and proportionality, but reasoned opinions may only al-
lege breaches of subsidiarity. The principle of legality, i.e. the requirement of a
competence-conferring legal basis for EU action, is not even mentioned there. Nev-
ertheless, it is evident that all of these review criteria are relevant to parliaments
conducting the check. In other words: based on the wording of their reasoned opin-
ions, parliaments have a need for a somewhat broader scope of the subsidiarity check.
This includes, for instance, a discussion of the necessity for EU action, as often it is
claimed that a usual international agreement between the Member States is preferable
to an EU measure or that such an international agreement already exists and works
well. In addition to substantive objections, a routinely voiced criticism points to an
alleged lack or insufficiency of the necessary justification of EU proposals. This may
then violate the heavier burden of justification as it results from Article 5 of Protocol
no. 2, or constitute a procedural breach of the subsidiarity principle.
To illustrate divergent approaches, we may consider the example of the oft-cited
proposal on the rights of seasonal workers from third countries in the EU.13 The two
chambers of the Dutch parliament claimed that the Commission had failed to jus-
tify the added value of the proposal, notably because labour market conditions were
said to vary across Member States and regions and because existing international
collaboration was deemed sufficient. The chambers of the Czech parliament phrased
12COM (2009) 154 final, see also the report: COSAC Secretariat, Report on the Results of the Subsidiarity
Check on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters
of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, Madrid, May 2010, available at
cosac.eu.
13COM (2010) 379 final.
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this on narrower subsidiarity grounds: in their view neither existing provisions in
the Member States were insufficient to reach the desired goal, nor did the proposed
EU measure have sufficient added value. This closely corresponds with the two sub-
sidiarity criteria as they are formulated in Article 5 (3) TEU. The Austrian Bundesrat
mainly claimed that there were insufficient cross-border aspects in this matter since
each Member State was itself responsible for its own seasonal workers and their equal
treatment with its own nationals. The Latvian parliament alleged a breach of propor-
tionality but, interestingly enough, no breach of subsidiarity, confirming that, among
other things, inactivity on the part of the Union would even breach its Treaty obliga-
tions.
Another example of diverse approaches to subsidiarity control—and therefore, it
shall be argued, of the need for a broader scope of the procedure—is the equally oft-
cited CCCTB proposal on a common consolidated corporate tax base.14 The Swedish
parliament noted that differences between tax systems are exactly a sign of healthy
regulatory competition between economies and moreover reflected the preferences of
the respective communities—a textbook example of a pure, almost purist subsidiarity
argument. The Dutch lower chamber primarily focused, in a perhaps less pure man-
ner, on the prospect that some Member States may lose out as others gain advantages
from the proposed system, and that the measure would breach the Member States’ tax
sovereignty. The UK Commons considered subsidiarity breached above all because
they found the Commission’s justification to the contrary less than compelling.
It may be noted as a matter of general observation that some parliaments feel more
bound by the scope of subsidiarity than others. Some chambers pay little attention to
the limits of subsidiarity review. The chambers of the Dutch parliament, by con-
trast, whether they send joint or separate opinions, seek to formulate their opinions
as much as possible as subsidiarity arguments, and even where they discuss legality
or proportionality, this is still neatly separated through different headings. The result
is a relatively formal review style, which may be likened to advisory opinions from
a Council of State where it checks whether a bill complies with the constitution.15
Practitioners point out that this resulted at the early stages from the fact that civil
servants would draw up draft opinions, whereas these opinions have become more
political as of late.16 And still Dutch opinions are in no way comparable to the un-
abashedly political views expressed by the UK House of Lords, or to the letters from
the German Bundesrat which routinely proposes detailed amendments to virtually
every article in an EU draft legislative act, including the mentioned seasonal work-
ers proposal. The Dutch parliament may, regarding its style of reasoned opinions, be
rather grouped together with the Greek parliament, the Austrian Bundesrat and the
French Senate. Undoubtedly they are all driven by political incentives—otherwise no
politician would invest time and energy into the writing of letters—but here one seeks
to implement the task in a sober and subsidiarity-oriented way. Either because one is
aware of the risk that otherwise at some point opinions will not be counted as votes, or
14COM (2011) 121 final. This proposal has been prominently discussed at an ERA seminar on the practical
implementation of the subsidiarity check held at Trier in June 2011.
15See Kiiver [6].
16Kester, van Keulen [4].
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because one simply wishes to stick to the letter of the Treaties; perhaps because the
relatively calm subsidiarity check allows mainstream politicians to complain about
EU proposals without coming across as Eurosceptics. Or because of a combination
of several factors.
5 Recommendations
It is hoped that scholarship can make a contribution to practice through a thorough
legal analysis of procedural rules on the subsidiarity check and a calm comparative
reflection on its use. The result is in this case a set of recommendations for members
of national parliaments and also, perhaps even primarily, parliamentary staff involved
in the drafting of reasoned opinions.
The main recommendation is to phrase possible objections to EU measures as far
as possible in the form of subsidiarity arguments, even if they have only partly to
do with subsidiarity proper, and to indicate explicitly and clearly that the respective
letter is a reasoned opinion in the sense of Protocol no. 2 alleging a breach of the sub-
sidiarity principle in the sense of Article 5 TEU. One often sees opinions which do
not explicitly discuss subsidiarity or which do not clearly claim a breach. The risk is
that the Commission will consider the letter as input to the political dialogue, outside
the subsidiarity check, and reply to it individually. In contrast with a triggered yellow
card, the news value of such an event for the media is relatively low. Let us be hon-
est: even though to an academic the subsidiarity check may most closely resemble an
advisory procedure,17 or a dialogue rather than co-legislative bargaining,18 to politi-
cians it is still highly interesting whether they can actually stop undesired legislation
or not. If this is the case, then it is advisable to play by the rules.
What if a complaint does not directly relate to subsidiarity? It is usually a shame
to see an objection of this sort vanish into the political dialogue. But there are possi-
bilities to adopt a somewhat broader interpretation of the subsidiarity check without
breaching the letter of the Protocol. First, it is absolutely legitimate to declare an
insufficient justification a procedural breach of the principle of subsidiarity, in par-
ticular of Article 5 of the Protocol. National parliaments are not expected to supply
justifications for EU measures of their own, but to verify whether proposals violate
the subsidiarity principle in accordance with Protocol no. 2, which after all includes
the initiators’ duty to justify. Second, also legality or competence can be brought un-
der the subsidiarity check. Without competence the Union is unable to achieve its
aims better than the Member States, so that without competence a subsidiarity ver-
dict can never be positive. An absence of competence for the EU, and even a partial
encroachment upon Member States’ competences by one of a proposal’s provisions,
is a legitimate ground for a reasoned opinion. This is true, for example, where an
internal-market directive threatens to unlawfully regulate an aspect of family law,
substantive criminal law or tax law of the Member States. Third, even under a sub-
sidiarity heading a proposal can go ‘too far’. This does not exclusively have to be a
17See note 15 above.
18Cooper [3], pp. 281–304.
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matter of proportionality and thus be ignored. For even under subsidiarity a certain
gradation is conceivable. There may be enough subsidiarity-based legitimacy for, say,
an EU recommendation—because the Union has a better overview of diverse laws in
the Member States than the individual Member States themselves—but this does not
mean that there is automatically enough subsidiarity for any type of EU action. Sub-
sidiarity may run out, as it were, when it comes to total harmonization. In other words,
subsidiarity is not a binary principle for certain policy sectors but must be applied to
proposals, and provisions within proposals, on a case-by-case basis. This may also
be reflected in reasoned opinions.
Finally, a small recommendation is in order. It does not seem advisable to claim
as a national parliament that a subject should be dealt with via an international agree-
ment instead of through an EU measure. Some parliaments state this occasionally.
It is surely legitimate to argue that an already existing international agreement—the
ILO in the case of seasonal workers, the ECHR in the case of suspects’ right to an
interpreter in criminal proceedings—makes EU action superfluous, or that the global
dimension of a problem makes even EU action inadequate so that it will not produce
better results than individual national action. But the argument that an agreement yet
to be concluded is a better or more effective alternative to an EU measure is implau-
sible and in fact dangerous from the parliament’s own point of view. After all, the
parliament thereby concedes that there is a problem that requires a cross-border ap-
proach, which is in fact one of the classical cases where subsidiarity justifies transna-
tional measures. Furthermore, subsidiarity is not concerned with the choice between
EU and non-EU international regulation. Those who argue in favour of international
agreements will thus potentially fail to score any votes in the subsidiarity check and,
in fact, will only strengthen the Commission’s hand by admitting the existence of a
transnational problem.
6 Conclusion
Many views are possible on the nature and meaning of the subsidiarity check by na-
tional parliaments in the EU. For some the system is fine as it is, whether they mean
it honestly or cynically because they do not want it to be any stronger; for others,
the mechanism is not powerful enough. In either case it is advisable to recognize the
procedure for what it is: it is not simply a loose exchange of opinions, but a communi-
cation framework that is subject to legally defined procedural rules, including admis-
sibility criteria and deadlines. Regarding the form and scope of reasoned opinions, the
national parliaments are still largely experimenting: they compare each other’s letters
and observe that different styles are possible, and the Commission is, for now, not too
strict in assessing the admissibility of such letters, certainly where the numbers are
still a long way from reaching the official thresholds. But some recommendations are
possible already now. It is certainly the safest option for a parliament to phrase objec-
tions as subsidiarity arguments, and it is possible to thereby include considerations
which are also related to adjacent principles, notably competence, proportionality
and the duty to justify. This article sought to bring those adjacent principles within
the scope of the subsidiarity check, thereby accommodating national parliaments’ ev-
ident need for a broader scope, without violating the letter of the Treaties. If national
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parliaments use this scope, they are also advised to seize the potential media value
of a triggered yellow card: those who harbour objections should not be too subtle in
expressing them as mere worries or reservations. A proper reasoned opinion should
contain, in the very beginning, a standard formula that makes clear that this is in fact
a reasoned opinion alleging a breach of the principle of subsidiarity within the mean-
ing of Article 5 TEU and Protocol no. 2. A more nuanced reasoning may still follow
afterwards.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
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